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The opening o f Buenos Aires to  international trade was traditionally 
considered one o f  the great gains o f independence. The entry o f foreign 
shipping, entrepreneurs and manufactured goods, and the export o f 
estancia products direct to  the markets o f the world were assumed to 
constitute a new stage in the history o f Argentina, the precursor o f  the 
country’s incorporation into the world economy. M odern histori­
ography has cast som e doubts on these conclusions. It has been pointed  
ou t that the m arket and the trade o f the Río de la Plata were small in 
dim ension and the prospects o f grow th severely limited. “Slow turnover, 
poor communications, high tariffs and com missions,” all m ade foreign 
merchants hesitate before investing capital in Argentine trade (Platt 
1972: 23-38, 55). O thers have argued that comercio libre simply led to  the 
substitution o f one m etropolis by another, and that dependence on 
Spain was replaced by dependence on G reat Britain.
The tru th  appears to  lie elsewhere. W hile Argentina may have been on 
the periphery o f British interests in the period 1810-1850, this does not 
m ean that British trade was un im portan t or ineffective in Argentina. 
From the standpoint o f  Argentina, British trade occupied the centre o f its 
econom ic world. Foreign trade in general, and British trade in particular, 
produced specific changes in the Argentine economy, namely estancia 
expansion, commercial grow th, and industrial stagnation. Yet it would be 
a mistake to in terpret this in term s o f  dependency. A rgentina relied 
upon British manufacturers, British shipping, British markets, but it did 
not yet need -  could no t yet use -  British banking and technology, it 
made its own econom ic decisions, and it was by no means a dependency 
o f  Britain.
In the afterm ath o f independence it was the large estancia which created 
wealth and conferred status. But this did no t happen immediately. The 
econom y o f Buenos Aires as it em erged from  the colonial regime was 
dom inated by com merce not land. The merchants o f the p o rt made their 
profits no t by exporting the products o f the country but by im porting
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manufactured goods for a consum er m arket stretching from Buenos 
Aires to  Potosí, in exchange for precious metals which at the time o f  inde­
pendence accounted for 80 per cent o f total exports from Buenos Aires. 
U ntil about 1815-20 the landed sector was limited, bo th  in the num ber of 
title-holders and in the extent o f  their holdings.
T he colonial legacy was altered by two developm ents. First, the m er­
chants o f  Buenos Aires were squeezed ou t by the British. W ith  their 
superior capital resources and contacts in Europe, the British took  over 
the entrepreneurial function previously exercised by the Spaniards and 
forced the porteños to seek alternative investm ents. Unable to  com pete 
in a British-dom inated commerce, local entrepreneurs found outlets in 
another expanding sector, livestock farming. Secondly, the trade o f Bue­
nos Aires with the interior had depended upon the latter’s ability to  earn 
from  the sale o f  its products, especially from its agrarian activities and its 
artisan industries. But increasing British penetration provided severe 
com petition for these industries, at a tim e when war and secession was 
also rem oving traditional markets in Chile and U pper Peru.
T he com bination o f  British com petition and decline o f the interior ren­
dered the Buenos Aires econom y incapable o f sustaining the local m er­
chant elite, w ho began therefore to  seek o ther outlets for their capital. 
T he principal outlet was pasture farming, which began to  expand at the 
expense o f  arable farming, to  such an extent that the province soon came 
to  depend on im ported grain. In the 1820s a livestock estancia yielded 
returns o f 31.4 per cent on investm ent, com pared to the 25 per cent 
return on arable farming (Barba 1967). Investm ent in land, cattle and 
saladeros was aided by the agrarian policy o f  the governm ent. From 1822 
Bernardino Rivadavia supported the system o f em phyteusis, authorising 
public land to  be rented out for tw enty years at fixed rentals. This sim ul­
taneously p u t land to productive use, including new land in the south 
and south-w est o f  the province, and satisfied the land hunger o f the 
dom inant groups. But em phyteusis favoured latifundism and land con­
centration. A small group o f  m en became lords o f the whole province. 
T here was no limit to the area a proprie tor m ight rent, and the land com ­
missions which adm inistered distribution were dom inated by landow n­
ers. From 1824 to 1827 a num ber o f huge individual grants were made, 
over 6 1/2 million acres to 112 people and companies, o f w hom  ten re­
ceived m ore than 130,000 acres each. By the 1830s som e 21 million acres 
o f public land had been transferred to  500 individuals. Some individuals 
received grants o f over 65,000 acres each.
As the cattle industry grew in im portance, as livestock property  acquired
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a new value, so the estancieros began to  desire freehold property w ithout 
tim e limit, conditions, or rent.Juan Manuel de R osas,governor o f Buenos 
Aires from  1829, abandoned em phyteusis and sold land in freehold.The 
law o f 10 May 1836 authorised the sale o f  1,500 square leagues o f  em phy­
teusis land and unoccupied land. The actual occupants o f em phyteusis 
land could buy their holdings, and they were encouraged to  do so by a 
further law o f 16 January 1838 which ordered the sale o f  em phyteusis 
lands where the rent had no t been paid, and the law o f 25 August 1838 
which ordered the doubling o f  the rent. There was no rush to  buy land; 
the French blockade o f  1838 depressed commercial agriculture by closing 
export outlets, and in default o f purchasers the governm ent decided to 
give land away. Rosas him self was one o f  the principal beneficiaries o f 
this bountiful policy, and he and his officers were lavishly rew arded after 
the D esert Campaign o f  1833, as were the military w ho took  part in 
crushing the Rebellion o f  the South in 1839. In 1830 the province o f  Bue­
nos Aires had 5,516 square leagues o f occupied land, and this was held by 
980 people; o f  these 60 people held alm ost 4,000 square leagues, or 76 
per cent o f the whole. By 1851 the structure had no t basically changed: 
6,100 square leagues were occupied by 782 people, o f  w hom  382 m o­
nopolised 82 per cent o f  all property over one square league (Carretero 
1972: 13-14).
Estancia expansion was a response to the opportunities offered by in ter­
national trade. But this was not the only factor. T he new economy also 
reflected the preferences and decisions o f  social interests. T he hacenda­
dos o f Buenos Aires did not acquire these great estates as mere status 
symbols, for the sake o f  size alone, or to leave them  vacant. They bought 
land in order to export. The m ost successful landowners were men of 
urban origin w ith powerful business instincts. The estancias o f  the 
Rosas-Anchorena group were all situated in well-watered zones, 
carefully chosen for productivity and accessibility to  export routes; and 
they were m odels o f industry and yield, producing up to  the very limit o f 
their holdings. A m ong the various merchants who invested urban for­
tunes in land the A nchorena were suprem e, extending their estancias as a 
commercial investm ent, and participating at each stage o f  production 
from the pam pas to  the port.
T he first m odel o f  grow th was that o f Rivadavia. He wanted to m odern­
ize Argentina, seeking developm ent through free trade, foreign invest­
m ent, and im m igration. In addition to  renting ou t state land in order to 
p u t the natural resources o f  Argentina to  productive use, he also invited 
British entrepreneurs to  invest in mining, though the results were nega-
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tive. T he governm ent authorised a private com pany com posed largely o f 
British merchants to establish the Bank o f D iscount o f  the province of 
Buenos Aires (2 0 ju n e  1822), w ith a projected capital o f  1 million dollars. 
A loan o f T l  million was negotiated by the House o f  Baring in 1824. Riva- 
davia had a vision o f liberal institutions and a new infrastructure, a great 
and unified Argentina, ruled from  Buenos Aires and undivided by politi­
cal and econom ic particularism. But his innovations threatened the in ter­
ests o f  the estancieros. The federalisation o f  the city o f  Buenos Aires and 
its environs am putated the best part o f  the province and a large section 
o f  the population. It also involved nationalising the revenues o f the port, 
which am ounted to  75 per cent o f the provincial governm ent’s income, 
arousing the fear that the next step would be to  raise alternative revenue 
by an income or land tax. To the world o f  the landowners, for w hom  Bue­
nos Aires and its hinterland, p o rt and province, were one, these measures 
threatened division and disaster. The estancieros saw Rivadavia as a dan­
ger to  their econom ic and fiscal assets; im m igration they opposed as 
expensive, unnecessary and probably subversive, bringing com petition 
for land and labour and raising the cost o f bo th .T hey resisted these plans 
and forced their author to  resign in June 1827.
A new econom ic in terest thus came to  power, the estancieros, replacing 
the classic elite o f the revolution o f  1810, the politicians, the bureaucrats 
and the military, and representing a m ore prim itive and m ore specialised 
econom y — cattle p roduction for export o f hides and salt m eat — but one 
which brought im m ediate returns and was in harm ony with the coun­
try’s traditions. For the next twenty-five years these m en ruled the 
country and gave it political stability which was the fram ework o f eco­
nom ic grow th. As the form er British consul observed o f  Rosas and 
Anchorena, “they have as individuals im m ense interests and property, 
depending upon a continuance o f  dom estic peace, which they have been 
able to  preserve since they came into pow er”.1
By the 1840s the great grassy plains o f Buenos Aires were divided into 
well-stocked estancias and supported som e 3 million head o f  cattle, the 
basic wealth o f  p o rt and province, and the sustenance o f the export econ­
omy. They were animals o f  inferior quality, fed by the natural grasses o f 
the pam pas, raised in the open range under the care o f  one herdsm an for 
at least 3,000 head; but they were capable o f producing two saleable p ro ­
ducts, hides and salted meat.
T he estancia had to  sell its products in Buenos Aires and beyond. The
1 Parish to Bowles, Feb. 14, 1839, PRO, FO 354/9, W oodbine Parish Papers.
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principal outlet was the saladero, a large establishm ent where beasts were 
slaughtered, tallow extracted, flesh salted and dried, and hides prepared 
for export. The first saladero in Buenos Aires began operations in 1810, 
and after som e interruption they became firmly established from 1819. By 
1820 there were about twenty saladeros in the province, though their o u t­
p u t was relatively low, under one hundred animals a day in a single sala­
dero. By the 1840s, however, while the num ber o f saladeros in and about 
Buenos Aires was still about twenty, their ou tpu t had grow n enorm ously 
and each slaughtered som e 200 to  400 animals a day during the season, a 
much greater consum ption than the mataderos, which slaughtered cattle 
for the dom estic m eat market. Jerked beef was flesh cut in strips, pickled, 
salted and dried in the sun. It was unacceptable to m ost palates but was 
exported to  Brazil and Cuba for feeding to the slaves. The hides were 
steeped in brine, laid out in salt and then stretched ou t to dry, the stretch­
ing being varied according to  the thickness or fineness required. 
A lthough the principal tool in the saladero was the gaucho’s knife, steam 
pow er had been introduced for producing tallow. Cattle was always paid 
for in cash. In the 1840s the price was about three pesos each, if  delivered 
to  the saladero. According to an English businessman, “The cost o f  an 
establishm ent capable o f slaughtering a thousand head per week, is about 
two thousand pounds; although several have cost their owners much 
m ore: the steam ing apparatus alone will require about one thousand 
pounds” (McCann 1853,1:215).To establish a saladero, therefore, required 
a large investm ent o f  capital; overheads were heavy and the p lant needed 
good m anagem ent if it was to yield a profit and w ithstand com petition 
from other provinces. M ost saladeros belonged to  associations rather 
than individuals and many foreigners had capital in the industry.
The saladeros, therefore, were an integral part o f  the estancia world and as 
such they were favoured by the governm ent, even when they were offen­
sive to public health and a menace to the environm ent. In his annual 
Message o f  1849 Rosas rem inded the House o f  Representatives that 
“these great establishm ents deserve the protection o f  the governm ent, 
because they are factories which are vital to the national w ealth” (Mensajes 
Buenos Aires 1976, II: 27l). In fact they were easily the largest industry of 
Buenos Aires, by reason o f the num ber o f people they em ployed and the 
capital invested in them . The “pro tection” o f  which Rosas spoke con­
sisted o f virtual exem ption from  taxes. In 1852, out o f a total revenue of 
45,195,332 pesos raised by the provincial governm ent, only 100,000 pesos 
came from taxes on th t  saladeros. And the custom s law o f 1835 exem pted 
from export tax all jerked beef shipped in national vessels. Financed and
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managed by experts, supplied by the estancias, favoured by the govern­
m ent, the saladeros increased their output. The export o f jerked beef from 
Buenos Aires rose from 113,404 quintals (1,462,042 pesos) in 1835, to 
198,046 quintals (2,915,796 pesos) in 1841, a good year after the blockade, 
to  431,873 quintals in 1861 (Nicolau 1970).
Buenos Aires lived by foreign trade, and its expanding estancias depend­
ed on foreign markets (see Table l). In the early years after indepen­
dence there was a sizeable trade gap, as exports o f  precious metals fell
Table 1
Average Annual Exports from Buenos Aires 1810-1855, Selected Commodities
1810s 1820s 1830s 1840s 1850s
Cattle hides, nos. 574,460 624,101 798,564 2,303,910 1,762,356
Horse hides, nos. 144,898 206,880 31,903 163,022 158,220
Salted meat, tons 1,082 1,648 10,846 23,203 20,955
Tallow, tons 1,420 416 2,278 10,462 8,516
W ool, tons 163 277 2,309 6,752 11,091
Sources'. Humphreys (1940); Parish (1852); Brown (1979).
and im ports o f consum er goods rose, and it took  two decades for live­
stock exports to redress the balance. In 1829 and 1832 there was still a 
large excess o f im ports over exports, and the differences had to  be m et 
by exporting specie. The result was shortage o f  currency at hom e and its 
replacem ent by ever larger issues o f  paper m oney. The m edium  o f in ter­
national trade were letters o f credit drawn on the London exchange, and 
British m erchants came to  dom inate the financial m arket o f Buenos 
Aires. The essential link was the trade in textiles from Britain against 
hides from  Argentina, a trade which underw ent steady though not bril­
liant grow th, except during the years o f  blockade, in 1838-40 and 1845-47, 
w hen it suffered a sharp drop. According to  the form er British consul, 
W oodbine Parish, from 1822 to 1837 exports from  Buenos Aires rose in 
value from about .6700,000 to  £1  m illion; from 1837 to  1851 they doubled 
in value to T2 million a year (Parish 1852: 353-356, 36l).
H ides form ed the bulk o f  these exports. There was an average annual 
export o f 798,564 cattle hides from Buenos Aires in the 1830s; 2,303,910 
in the 1840s. In 1836 hides am ounted to  68.4 per cent o f the total value o f 
exports from Buenos Aires; in 1851 they am ounted to 64.9 per cent. If 
jerked beef and o ther cattle products are added to  hides, the livestock 
industry contributed 82.8 per cent o f total exports in 1836, 78 per cent in
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1851. The basic cause o f  export grow th was the incorporation o f m ore 
land into the economy, especially the expansion o f the southern frontier 
after the D esert Campaign o f  1833; the province o f Buenos Aires now 
produced about tw o-thirds o f all hides exported from the littoral p rov­
inces. A secondary cause were the foreign blockades im posed on Buenos 
Aires, which served to divert idle commercial capital into land and 
helped to  increase the cattle stock by temporarily stopping shipm ent o f 
hides, thus leaving the cattle to multiply in the pam pas for future use.
Table 2
Argentine Imports in 1825 by Country o f Origin
Country Pesos Fuertes Percentage
Great Britain 4,000,000 51.11
France 550,000 7.03
N orthern Europe 425,000 5.43
Gibraltar, Spain and Medit. 575,000 7.35
United States 900,000 11.50
Brazil 950,000 12.14
Havana and other countries 425,000 5.43
Total 7,825,000 99.99
Source: Parish (1852).
Meanwhile im ports into Buenos Aires rose from a total o f ( 1.5 million in 
1825 (see Table 2) to C2.1 million in 1850, an increase which was probably 
even greater in quantity than in value, owing to the falling price o f m anu­
factured goods in Europe. The growing im ports reflected the increasing 
affluence and rising expectations o f  a consum er society, which even 
reached into the popular sectors. W hen foreigners arrived in Buenos 
Aires in the early 1820s, they were struck by the prim itive furnishings and 
the scarcity o f  consum er goods in the houses o f the city. But in the 
course o f the next few decades there was a revolution in taste, fashion 
and habits, w ith the influx o f European furniture, French wallpaper, Eng­
lish grates. This was the beginning o f  conspicuous expenditure am ong 
wealthy porteños. There was very little saving or capital accumulation. 
Im ports o f  luxury and consum ergoods used up any surplus capital which 
m ight otherw ise have been invested. Pianos, clocks, jewelry and precious 
stones com prised 10 per cent o f  im ports. Consum er goods o f  a luxury 
kind (furniture and hardware, clothes and shoes) for the quality m arket 
am ounted to 32 per cent. Thus alm ost half o f the im ports were manufac­
tured goods for the upper end o f  the market. Industrial raw materials
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such as coal, iron and other metals accounted for only 3 per cent of 
im ports, an indication o f  the small degree o f  industrialisation, the 
absence o f technology, and the low level o f  artisan em ploym ent. 
Shipping was a further indicator o f  the grow th o f foreign trade. In the 
1820s an average o f  288 foreign ships a year called at Buenos Aires; in the 
1850s the num ber had grown to 674. British shippers led the race to the 
Río de la Plata after independence, and in the 1810s they carried 60 per 
cent o f  the trade in and ou t o f Buenos Aires. By mid-century, w ith com ­
petition growing, British shipping in Buenos Aires was 25 per cent o f the 
total. M ost o f  the trade w ent to Britain (322 vessels and 22.8 per cent o f 
tonnage in 1849-51) and the U nited States (253 vessels and 21.6 per cent 
o f  tonnage), though this still left a substantial portion o f  trade (33 per 
cent) to  less developed countries, Cuba, Brazil, Italy and Spain (Nicolau 
1973: 359-361).
British merchants dom inated the trade o f  the Río de la Plata in the first 
tw o decades after independence, and they had a balance o f trade in their 
favour, which Argentina had to bridge by exporting specie. The right 
goods, at com petitive prices, these were the key to  the British success 
and gave them  control o f the mass market, especially in cotton textiles. 
Every stage o f factory expansion, every im provem ent in machinery, 
every lowering o f  production costs, consolidated the British hold o f  the 
market. C otton goods accounted for half o f all British exports to the Rio 
de la Plata; the rest included woollen, linen and silk manufactures, iron­
m ongery and cutlery, hardware, course and fine earthenware, glass and 
coal. The value o f  British trade to  Argentina did not rise spectacularly in 
the first half o f  the n ineteenth century. T he average annual exports in the 
period 1822-25 were between .6700,000 and .6800,000 sterling. In 1850 
the value o f British exports to Argentina was still about .6900,000. In be­
tween the trade suffered various vicissitudes, no t all o f  them  o f A rgenti­
na’s making.
In 1845-47 the British in a sense blockaded themselves. This was a tem ­
porary aberration. The longer failure to maintain their share o f trade 
expansion was due in part to  the loss o f  an early m onopoly as others 
com peted for a place; nevertheless, up to  1837 the value o f  British trade 
to  the River Plate exceeded that o f  all o ther foreign countries pu t to ­
gether; and even in 1850 it was no t far short o f  this (Parish 1852: 363). N o 
doub t the balance in favour o f  British trade was dim inishing as the Bri­
tish m arket consum ed m ore o f A rgentina’s raw materials, but the claim 
that by mid-century A rgentina had a trade surplus lacks substantial evi­
dence and remains unproven (Brown 1979: 82-84).
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Table 3
Declared Value of British Exports to the River Plate 1831-1850
Year £ Year £
1831 339,870 1841 989,362
1832 660,152 1842 969,791
1833 515,362 1843 700,416
1834 831,564 1844 785,564
1835 658,525 1845 592,279
1836 697,334 1846 187,481
1837 696,104 1847 490,504
1838 680,345 1848 606,953
1839 710,524 1849 1,399,575
1840 614,047 1850 909,280
Source: Parish (1852: 369).
There were fifty-five British mercantile houses in Buenos Aires in 1818, 
but the num ber had fallen a decade later (H um phreys 1940: 76). Blon- 
del’s directory o f Buenos Aires for 1829 listed thirty-eight British firms, 
am ounting to  33 per cent o f total houses; the other British establish­
m ents com prised eighteen grocers’ shops, four hotels, nine cabinet­
makers, three upholsterers, three blacksmiths, and fifty o ther retailers, 
artisans and professions (Mulhall 1878: 33l). Many o f  the British houses 
were elim inated by blockade and liquidation, as well as by com petition 
from other nations and from native entrepreneurs; in 1854 they still 
num bered thirty-seven, though were now  only 23 per cent o f  the total 
(Reber 1979: 56-57). The French trade to  the River Plate was next in 
im portance to  the British; it m ore than quadrupled between 1825 and 
1850, from  .£110,000 to  .£500,000, and consisted o f  silks, woollens, cot­
tons and wines. French imm igration, particularly from the Basque prov­
inces, helped to increase the artisan population o f Buenos Aires and also 
to stimulate dem and for French products. T he U nited States trade to the 
River Plate, one o f the chief articles o f which was flour to a cattle-dom i­
nated econom y, suffered a normal balance o f trade deficit; in 1849-50 the 
annual average o f  exports was $ 916,118, im ports $ 2,181,852 (Parish 1852: 
365, 367-368). W hoever they were, foreign m erchants were involved 
alm ost exclusively in wholesale trade, in im porting and exporting, and 
this they dom inated. The retail trade in p o rt and province, on the other 
hand, was the dom ain o f  the Argentines themselves, as was the prepara­
tion o f  local produce for export (Parish 1852: 120). Creoles were to  be 
found in coastal and river shipping, in the freight trade from the interior,
148 John Lynch
in collecting cattle and pastoral products from  estancias and delivering 
them  to Buenos Aires, in the ow nership o í  saladeros and warehouses. 
W hile there was considerable im port o f foreign goods and som e im port 
o f  foreign labour, there was as yet relatively little im port o f foreign capi­
tal into Buenos Aires, and in this period the export o f  profits was no t an 
issue. The Unitarian regime o f the 1820s had sought to attract foreign 
investm ent in m ining and other sectors o f the economy, but the results 
were meagre. In 1824 the H ouse o f  Baring made the governm ent a loan 
o f  T l,000,000 on Argentine securities; this m oney was no t invested in 
econom ic grow th but expended on the war with Brazil. The smallness o f 
export surpluses, the reluctance o f the governm ent to  im pose income or 
property  taxes, and the heavy expenditure on war, com bined to leave the 
governm ent little financial margin. Rosas sought to make ends m eet by 
revenue from customs and by curtailing non-military expenditure, and 
foreign creditors were not a high priority. “That Rosas never altered his 
financial policies in order to m eet the claims o f foreign creditors is due in 
part to  the unwillingness o f  the British G overnm ent to  apply any p res­
sure on behalf o f the bondholders” (Ferns I960: 220). T he annual charges 
arising out o f the loan were T65,000. Payment had been in default since 
1828: Buenos Aires did not have the revenue to renew it, and the British 
governm ent did no t press, leaving the bondholders to fend for them ­
selves through the agency o f the Barings. In D ecem ber 1831, Manuel 
M oreno, the A rgentine m inister in London, received a representation 
from  twenty bonoleros, as Rosas called them , which he forwarded to Bue­
nos Aires, but there was no m oney to spare. In 1842, to  im prove relations 
w ith Britain, Rosas show ed a willingness to renew servicing the loan, and 
Francis Falconnet, an agent o f  the Barings, w ent to Buenos Aires to con­
duct negotiations. The result was that Buenos Aires undertook  to pay 
Barings TbOOO a m onth  from May 1844 (Archivo Americano, no. 14, Bue­
nos Aires, Aug. 31,1844). But paym ents were suspended in 1845 and not 
resum ed until 1849.
Buenos Aires pursued a relatively free trade policy towards the outside 
world and offered order and security to foreign merchants. The principle 
obstacles to trade were created by the foreigners themselves, or rather by 
their governm ents. The French blockade o f  1838 stifled the exports o f 
the port and reduced im ports, causing great inflation and much unem ­
ploym ent in the capital. It was also a contributory cause o f the rebellion 
o f  the southern estancieros in 1839- The Anglo-French blockade o f 1845 
was hardly m ore effective. The object was to  sustain Uruguay, to  secure 
free navigation, and perhaps to destroy Rosas. But it was a slow and
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clumsy weapon, which hit trade rather than the enemy. Rosas justly said 
o f blockades, “while they may annoy our countries, they do no t deprive 
us o f our principal resources, nor do they succeed in reducing our pow er” 
(Irazusta 1953-61, V: 7-8). Blockades hurt the foreigners rather than the 
natives. Its prim itive econom y made Argentina invulnerable to  outside 
pressure. It could always revert to a subsistence economy, waiting for 
pen t-up  trade to revive while its cattle resources accumulated. In any 
case, the blockade was no t absolute. There was a connived trade across 
the River Plate; m erchants favoured by bo th  sides were allowed to trade 
clandestinely, and an active blockade-running was carried on between 
Buenos Aires and M ontevideo by small craft sailing at night under the 
noses o f the patrolling squadron.
Theoretically, the blockades should have enabled local industry to recov­
er the m arket which it had previously lost to  foreign com epetition; in 
fact prices o f  manufactured goods simply rose and consumers suffered 
severe shortages. Y et there was a vociferous protectionist sector in 
Buenos Aires.
The state favoured cattle-breeders at the expense o f small farmers, and 
Buenos Aires depended ultimately on grain im ported from the U nited 
States and South Africa. Agriculture was subject to  particular obstacles 
and required special treatm ent. Labour was scarce and expensive, m eth ­
ods were primitive, and yield was low. The high cost o f transport forced 
farmers to  m ove nearer the city, where land prices were higher. In the 
vicinity o f  the capital there were a num ber o f chacras and m arket gardens, 
producing grain, maize and vegetables for the urban market. But they 
suffered always from  com petition from  foreign grain. Agriculture, there­
fore, needed capital and protection. A t this point, governm ents hesi­
tated, fearful o f causing dearer food and losing popular support. From 
independence to  1835 a low tariff policy prevailed, in favour o f  consum er 
and export interests, and in spite o f  farm ers’ complaints.
Farmers were not the only critics o f free trade. The littoral and interior 
provinces dem anded protection for native industries against m ore 
cheaply produced foreign goods, and called also for the opening o f other 
ports than Buenos Aires to direct foreign trade. But Buenos Aires re­
fused to  change its policy or to  relinquish its control o f  river navigation. 
It also refused to give protection to the “industries o f  the interior”, the 
wine and textiles o f the w estern provinces, which it considered marginal 
activities and no t w orth protecting. There was som e justification for this 
view. But the dem and for protection came not only from  farmers and 
provinces; there were also porteño  protectionists.
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Buenos Aires contained a num ber o f urban artisans, owners or 
em ployees o f  w orkshops, makers o f manufactured goods for the local 
market. Their num ber should no t be exaggerated. Buenos Aires was in 
many respects an extension o f the estancia and housed a “ruralised” 
population. The suburbs contained farmers and agricultural labourers. 
The saladeros and mataderos em ployed an essentially rural worker. In addi­
tion there was a large population o f  peons, carters, vagos y  mal entreteni­
dos', and o ther marginal types, w ho were directly or indirectly subject to, 
or sought by, the rural proprietors, themselves frequently city dwellers 
and involved in commerce. In 1856 18,000 porteños were registered as 
peones de campo and m ore than 2,000 as vagos, though the real num ber o f 
the latter was probably much higher (G ori 1965: 32). W hile Buenos 
Aires was thus a rural rather than an urban society, it still contained the 
traditional artisan industries, whose owners and workers were an in te­
gral part o f the urban structure. N um erous urban w orkshops manufac­
turing clothing, uniform s, shoes, hats, swords and silverware were scat­
tered about the capital. Quality o f  product was usually low, the market 
lim ited, and technology prim itive, but they survived. In 1831 Buenos 
Aires contained 94 leather w orkshops, 83 carpenters’ w orkshops, 47 iron 
forges, 42 silversmiths. T he military policy ol Rosas had the firm support 
o f this group, for it was war which kept many o f these industries at work, 
through dem ands for uniforms, equipm ent and hardware. The urban 
artisans were num erous enough, therefore, to carry som e political 
weight and, w ithout constituting a major pressure group, to  m erit con­
sideration.
Economic nationalism had no t yet developed in Buenos Aires; rather, 
different sectors sought privileges or protection for themselves. Estan­
cieros w anted cheap im ports and good export opportunities and there­
fore favoured free trade. But the foreign, and particularly the British, 
penetration o f Buenos Aires was bitterly opposed by others w ho argued 
that it am ounted to  outside control o f commerce, com peted with local 
industry, p u t people out o f work, and prevented the grow th o f  a national 
m erchant marine. To prom ote national manufactures som e local en t­
repreneurs proposed a fiscal policy ranging from  high duties to outright 
prohibition, a view seconded by the artisans o f  Buenos Aires who 
throughout the 1820s continued to  press for state intervention, dem an­
ding free im port o f  raw materials needed for manufacture and the p ro ­
tection o f goods processed out o f local raw materials.
The argum ent continued. The estancieros and free-trade interests were 
supported by those who opposed state intervention on principle and
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maintained that industry would only flourish when it was qualified to  do 
so, and that national manufactures which could not com pete in price and 
quality with foreign im ports were not w orth protecting. Pedro de Ange- 
lis, one o f  the m ore enlightened spokesm en o f the Rosas regime, 
strongly attacked the idea o f giving protection to  the provincial wine 
industry and the porteño  shoe industry, on the grounds that protection 
would raise prices for the mass o f consumers, and divert to  industry 
labourers who w ould be better em ployed in the agrarian sector. N ever­
theless, concern for the adverse balance o f paym ents, if not for industrial 
labour, was sufficient to keep the protectionist lobby alive and the 
governm ent interested. The hat industry and the growing leather m anu­
factures were am ong the m ore prom inent groups dem anding protection 
against the influx o f foreign im ports. O thers spoke for native artisans 
against the presence o f  foreign personnel w ithin the capital. An artisan 
writing in 1832 argued that foreign manufacturing establishm ents in 
Buenos Aires were favoured by their exem ption from military service: 
“W hile a native o f  the country has to serve in person or pay a substitute 
for him self and his employees, a foreigner and his workers (who are 
usually o f  his own nation) can continue operating w ithout in terrup­
tion.”2
In due course Rosas accepted the case for protection, and in the ley de 
aduana o f  Decem ber 1835 he introduced higher im port duties. From a 
basic duty o f 17 percen t, the tariff m oved upwards, giving greater pro tec­
tion to m ore vulnerable products, until it reached a po in t o f prohibiting 
the im port o f a large num ber o f  articles such as textiles, hardware and, 
under certain conditions, wheat. The policy o f  1835 was new in that it 
sought to give positive protection to arable agriculture and the manufac­
turing industries.
Rosas did no t explain his action in any detail. W e do no t know his 
thoughts concerning local industry or the possibility o f  national self-suf­
ficiency. W as he really convinced that his regime could decrease its 
dependence on foreign im ports, resist foreign com petition, and tolerate 
the higher living costs? There is no clear answer to these questions, and 
historians have been forced to speculate. M iron Bürgin has argued that 
Rosas was m oved by concern for “the welfare o f the m iddle classes”, and 
that it would have been “politically dangerous” to  resist these interests 
(Bürgin 1946: 237, 240, 242, 263-264). According to  this interpretation,
2 Mariluz Urquijo (1969: 85-87), quoting Diario de la Tarde (Buenos Aires,Jan. 14, 
1832).
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the federalist party was losing ground in the mid-1830s and needed to 
w iden its social base. But there appeared to  be no reason why, in 1835-36, 
Rosas required the support o f popular or middle groups; the regime was 
based firmly on the estancieros, who rem ained its closest allies. The 
objectives o f Rosas seem to have been to  sustain the existing economic 
structure, while protecting  those m inority groups w ho suffered m ost 
from it, the industrial and farming sectors.
T he Message o f  Rosas to the H ouse o f  Representatives in Decem ber 1835 
gave som e indication o f his m otives:
Agriculture and the growing manufacturing industry o f the country have long suf­
fered from the absence o f protection. And the middle class o f our country, unable 
for lack o f capital to participate in the livestock industry, have been deprived of 
that incentive to work which is normally stimulated by concern to provide for the 
future and for one’s children. The governm ent has taken this fact into considera­
tion, noting that foreign agriculture and industry thwart these legitimate aspira­
tions w ithout however bringing noticeable improvements in make or quality 
{Mensajes Buenos Aires 1976, 1: 95).
At the same tim e the law had a strong inter-provincial content; it was 
designed to make the federalist policy credible by giving protection to 
the provinces as well as to Buenos Aires. Consequently Rosas had to 
explain away the 20 per cent im port duty on cigars, which hit the Co­
rrientes cigar trade to Buenos Aires. He w rote to the the governor o f  Co­
rrientes pointing out that he had to pro tect his own people: “As for the 
question o f  cigars, I had in m ind the powerful consideration that in this 
province there are many poor w om en w ho live from this type of 
industry.”5 But he w ent on to argue that there were com pensating factors 
in other parts o f the tariff, favouring the provinces against Buenos Aires; 
an example was the prohibition o f the im port o f  foreign ponchos which 
were notoriously cheaper to  the porteño  consum er than the m ore expen­
sive protected  article manufactured in the provinces. Subsequently, after 
the tariff had been am ended upwards, Rosas claimed in his Message of 
January 1837:
The changes made in the customs law in favour o f agriculture and industry have 
begun to have a good effect [...] The artisan workshops have employment for 
young people, who under the vigilance o f the police have ceased to disturb streets 
and thoroughfares, and one should hope that the prosperity o f these classes will 
increase the im port o f the numerous articles o f foreign industry which have not 
been prohibited or charged with extra duties. In fact foreign trade grows percep­
tibly (Mensajes Buenos Aires 1976,1: 113).
3 Rosas to Atienza,July 20, 1836 in Levene (1939-50, VII. 2: 182).
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Again he explained that protection was designed not only for Buenos 
Aires but also for the provinces. But perhaps the m ost interesting part o f 
his speech was the argum ent that revival o f artisan industries would 
increase em ploym ent and spending pow er am ong the popular sectors, 
which in turn would im prove the dem and for foreign im ports, or those 
no t im peded by protection, and thus benefit international trade. Rosas 
thus offered the benefits o f  protection  and free trade simultaneously. But 
w hat was the real situation?
The consequences o f the protective tariff o f 1835 have been much debat­
ed. Some critics in the industrial sector im m ediately claimed that the p ro ­
tection given was no t sufficient. Shoemakers, w ho were am ong the m ost 
num erous artisans o f  Buenos Aires, argued in 1836 that the 35 per cent 
im port duty im posed by the new law did no t give adequate protection, 
and that they needed outright prohibition o f foreign im ports if they were 
to  survive. They probably exaggered: while there was certainly severe 
com petition at the top  o f the market, Buenos Aires was in fact exporting 
footw ear to  o ther provinces. A rgum ents from the industrial sector did 
not impress the governm ent. O n the whole subject o f protection Rosas 
him self had second thoughts. In 1838 im port duties were reduced by 
one-third in order to  minimise the effects o f  the French blockade. Then, 
claiming the need to  procure new revenues and pointing to  the shortage 
o f  certain articles, Rosas decided (31 D ecem ber 184l) to  allow the entry of 
a large list o f goods previously prohibited. The argum ent for free trade, in 
other words, seemed to  have been vindicated: national production had 
no t responded to protection, the tariff had merely caused shortages and 
high prices, and the principal victims were the consumers and the trea­
sury.
Rosas lost faith in protection, not w ithout reason. Protection m eant in 
effect giving artificial respiration to  the weakest sector o f the economy, 
while strangling the stronger. Very few Argentine producers or consum ­
ers w ould have thanked him for that. The bias towards a livestock-export 
econom y reflected the social structure as well as econom ic conditions. 
The upper groups preferred im ported manufactures, while the rest o f  the 
population did no t form a consum er m arket for national industries. 
There were few freedom s in Buenos Aires under Rosas, but free trade 
was one o f them .
The Buenos Aires o f  Rosas rested upon a primitive economy. Cattle-rais­
ing required relatively low investm ents in land and technology, and, if 
practised on an extensive scale in large units capable o f  dealing with fluc­
tuating export markets, it yielded very high profits. Investm ents had to
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be concentrated in cattle; therefore abundant, cheap, and secure land was 
required, and this the regime provided. But cattle-raising gave a limited 
range o f exports, mainly hides and jerked beef, for which international 
dem and was no t likely to  grow. The m arket for hides was far from 
dynamic, even when continental Europe began to  supplem ent Great 
Britain; and the dem and for salted beef, lim ited to  the slave economies o f 
Brazil and Cuba, was m ore likely to  contract than expand. The Rosas 
economy, therefore, faced present stagnation and future decline. 
Meanwhile, by the mid-1840s, the balance within the Confederation was 
no longer so overwhelmingly in favour o f Buenos Aires. From 1843 the 
littoral provinces made the m ost o f the peace which they enjoyed while 
Rosas continued to  fight over Uruguay. Cattle resources multiplied: 
Entre Ríos, w ith six million cattle, two million sheep and seventeen sala­
deros, was a new econom ic power. C om petition was no t yet critical: 
exports o f  jerked beef from Entre Ríos were still only 10 per cent those o f 
Buenos Aires. But there were political implications. The estancieros of 
Entre Ríos and Corrientes, profiting to som e extent from the blockade o f 
Buenos Aires, were not prepared to  endure for ever the m onopoly of 
trade and navigation enjoyed by the porteños. To respond to these chal­
lenges, the econom y o f Buenos Aires needed diversification and im ­
provem ent. These came in the form o f an alternative activity. Sheep farm­
ing had already begun to threaten the dom inance o f the cattle estancia. It 
was through the export o f  wool that Buenos Aires would expand its 
links with the world economy, diversify its production , and greatly 
enlarge its capital accumulation. From the econom ic po in t o f view Rosas 
became an anachronism, a legacy from another age.
The “merinization” of Buenos Aires, the rise of a large sheep and wool 
economy, began in the 1840s and was accompanied by a scramble for new 
land. The external stimulus was the expansion of the European textile 
industry, which provided a secure export market. Internal conditions 
were also favourable, consisting of good soil and a creole sheep stock 
capable of improvement by mixing with merino imports. In the early 
years of Independence estancieros showed little interest in improving 
breeds of sheep. It was left to a few Englishmen, John Harratt and Peter 
Sheridan in particular, to show the way; from the 1820s they began to 
purchase Spanish merinos, to preserve and refine the improved breeds, 
and to export from Buenos Aires to Liverpool, encouraged by the almost 
total abolition of import duties on the article in England. The growing 
interest in sheep breeding led to a new demand for labour. The gaucho 
was gradually replaced by the shepherd. Immigrant settlers arrived in
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Buenos Aires, either as hired labourers or as partners in profit-sharing 
schemes oras tenant farmers. Irish imm igrants were particularly welcome 
as shepherds, but Basques and Galicians also came, and som e o f them  
soon bought their own estates. O n the pam pas between Buenos Aires 
and the River Salado sheep were beginning to  drive cattle from the land; 
from the 1840s estancia after estancia passed into the hands o f  the sheep 
farmers. In 1810 the province had a stock o f 2-3 million sheep, but these 
were o f poor quality and occupied marginal lands. By 1852 the num ber 
had grow n to 15 million head, and in 1865 to  40 million (Chiaram onte 
1971: 62-64; K orol and Sábato 1981: 69-79). W ool exports increased from 
333.7 tons in 1829, to  1,609-6 tons in 1840, to 7,681 tons in 1850; they then 
accelerated to 17,316.9 tons in I860, 65,704.2 tons in 1870. In 1822 wool 
represented 0.94 per cent o f the total value o f  exports from  Buenos 
Aires, cattle hides 64.86 per cent; in 1836,7.6 per cent and 68.4 per cent 
respectively; in 1851,10.3 per cent and 64.9 per cent; in 1861,35.9 per cent 
and 33.5 per cent; in 1865, 46.2 per cent and 27.2 per cent.
Buenos Aires now became a wool port, exporting to  the textile factories 
o f Britain, Belgium and France; Argentina became the chief supplier o f 
French and Belgian manufacturers. The hegem ony o f the cattle estancia 
and the traditional foreign merchants was now challenged by an alterna­
tive econom y and a different m ode o f foreign trade. Overseas markets 
continued to  provide the dem and, but national social groups made the 
econom ic decisions. T he link between wool producers and the m arket 
was provided by a com plex system o f commercial networks, largely 
replacing old trading m ethods (Sábato 1983). Local interests profited 
from this new diversification o f the market, and com petition am ong 
foreign buyers reduced foreign control. In 1852 Argentina stood at the 
threshold o f a new stage o f  growth.
